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Executive Summary: 
The Egyptian military’s removal of Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Mohamed 
Morsi, on July 3, 2013 put the United States in a precarious position with its long standing ally.  
The military’s role in dismantling a fragile, fledgling democracy has strained relations with the 
Obama Administration and has caused the United States to reexamine its relationship with 
Egypt.  Critics contend the U.S. cannot credibly claim support for a transition to Egyptian 
democracy while continuing to fund the Egyptian military after its clearly undemocratic act of 
leading a coup d’état and arresting Egypt’s first democratically elected president just one year 
into his term (Sharp, 2014).   
 
Recent events, coupled with the U.S. response to them, have raised the question of whether the 
United States is as committed to stability within Egypt’s borders as it is along Egypt’s border 
with Israel, and whether U.S. military aid to Egypt has, in fact, contributed to the repression and 
instability within Egypt by helping build a military and security apparatus that operates with 
unchecked powers.  This tension was underscored by President Obama’s comments during a 
May 28, 2014 speech at West Point where he stated, “In countries like Egypt, we acknowledge 
that our relationship is anchored in security interests -- from peace treaties with Israel, to shared 
efforts against violent extremism.  So we have not cut off cooperation with the new government, 
but we can and will persistently press for reforms that the Egyptian people have demanded,” 
(White House, 2014).   
 
Such candor has been rare to come out of the White House or the State Department.  Both first 
expressed support for former president Hosni Mubarak during the early days of the 2011 
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revolution that eventually overthrew him.  Then in 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry described 
the Egyptian military’s overthrow and subsequent arrest of the democratically elected president 
Morsi as “restoring democracy” in Egypt (Bradley, 2013a).  Such inconsistent messages have 
left the United States appearing to be caught off guard by events in Egypt, and without a 
coherent policy or message.  This paper attempts to analyze United States policy toward Egypt 
since the military’s removal of that nation’s first democratically elected president, attempts to 
explain why the inconsistent policy of the Obama administration does not serve long-term U.S 
strategic interests in the Middle East, and offers policy recommendations that would advance 
U.S. interests in the future.  
 
Background: 
The United States has enjoyed a close relationship with Egypt for decades that is based on a 
mutual interest in peace and stability in the Middle East, helping to strengthen the Egyptian 
economy and trade relations between the two nations, as well as maintaining and promoting 
security throughout the region (State Dept., 2014a).  According to the U.S. State Department’s 
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “Egypt has been a key U.S. partner in ensuring regional stability 
and on a wide range of common security issues, including Middle East peace and countering 
terrorism,” (State Dept. 2014a).   Although the Obama Administration’s response to recent 
events in Egypt has sometimes appeared incoherent to many and been marked by a lack of 
consensus, the United States military in particular has been clear about the importance of the 
bilateral relationship, still viewing its relationship with Egypt’s military as vital to U.S. national 
security interests in the region, (Sharp, 2014).  In fact, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) 
“considers Egypt an anchor state,” (Sharp, 2014).   
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Because of this status, obtained through its cooperation with the United States, Egypt’s military 
has been provided with approximately $44 billion in military aid since 1979, after the signing of 
the 1978 Camp David Accords with Israel, (Sharp, 2014).  In fact, since 1979 Egypt has been the 
second largest recipient of total U.S. aid after Israel, (Sharp, 2014).  For Fiscal year 2014, the 
Egypt Bilateral Foreign Assistance Budget is approximately $1.5 billion and includes $1.3 
billion in military aid; $200 million in economic support funds; and over $7 million for other 
security assistance programs (U.S. State Department, 2014b). As the graph below illustrates, 
economic aid has been gradually reduced over the years while military aid has remained 
constant, causing it to represent an increasingly larger share of the overall aid package to Egypt. 
 
Figure 1; Congressional Research Service, 2014, (Sharp, 2014). 
The military aid takes two forms, Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military 
Education (IMET), (Curry, 2013).  FMF allows Egypt to be able to purchase U.S.-manufactured 
military equipment including Apache helicopters, F-16 aircraft, and M1A1 tanks (GAO, 2006).  
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IMET allows Egypt to purchase services such as U.S. training and maintenance & repair kits that 
are needed to support and maintain these systems long-term (GAO, 2006).   
 
In return for the annual aid package, among the benefits for the United States is easier access to, 
and through, the Suez Canal and Egyptian airspace (GAO, 2006).  According to the 
Congressional Research Service, Suez Canal access allows the U.S. Navy to “deploy carrier 
groups swiftly to the Persian Gulf region,” (Sharp, 2014).  Egypt has also been a key regional 
partner for U.S. counterterrorism efforts.  U.S. officials state, “the Egyptians have shared 
valuable intelligence and have provided other useful counterterrorism assistance, particularly in 
the decade since the 9/11 attacks,” (Hall & Wolf, 2011). 
 
Egypt’s status as the most populous Arab nation and the central arbiter of diplomatic and cultural 
influence in the Middle East has also made it a key partner with the United States in Israeli-
Palestinian peace negotiations, (Birnbaum, 2012).   Moreover, according to a 2014 report on U.S. 
- Egypt relations by the Congressional Research Service, “U.S. policy makers have routinely 
justified aid to Egypt as an investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running 
cooperation with the Egyptian military and on sustaining the March 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace 
Treaty, which followed the Camp David Accords.  Successive U.S. Administrations have 
publicly characterized Egypt’s government as generally influencing developments in the Middle 
East in line with U.S. interests ,” (Sharp, 2014).   
 
Former U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, Frank G Wisner still considers Egypt an important partner in 
“advancing U.S. security interests and regional stability,” (Wisner, 2014).  The Egyptian military 
contributed the fourth largest deployment of troops to the international coalition to liberate 
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Kuwait in the 1991 Gulf War and, “much of the American and allied deployment flowed through 
Egypt’s airports, airspace and the Suez Canal,” (Wisner, 2014).    According to Wisner, the close 
relationship began in 1973, with Egyptian cooperation during the cold war, and eventually led to 
Egyptian-Israeli peace, (Wisner, 2014).   
 
While the U.S. has enjoyed Egypt’s cooperation in maintaining stability along the Egyptian - 
Israeli border, among the things the military coup exposed is the seeming tension that exists 
between the pursuit of U.S. strategic interests in the region and American rhetoric about the 
promotion of democracy and human rights in the Arab world.  For example, the United States 
maintained a strong relationship with former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak during his 30 
years of repressive rule, even referring to him as a “strong and important ally”, (Zunes, 201).  In 
2009, when asked if he considered Mubarak an authoritarian ruler, President Obama replied, 
“No,” (Zunes, 2011).   
 
This is despite the fact that Mubarak ruled for 30 years under a draconian emergency law that 
forbade five or more people from gathering without a permit (Zunes, 2011).  The emergency law 
also allowed government authorities to arrest citizens and hold them without charges (CNN, 
2012).  Critics contend that the United States has historically overlooked authoritarianism in 
Egypt because the relationship between the United States and Egypt has been predicated 
primarily on Egypt maintaining peace with Israel.  In other words, the bilateral U.S. - Egypt 
relationship is not a purely bilateral relationship based on the interests of the two nations, but 
also on those of a third nation, Israel, with its interests of security and stability within and along 
its borders playing a prominent, if not paramount, role.     
6 
 
The Egypt – Israel Peace Treaty resulted in the normalization of relations between the two 
nations, including the exchange of ambassadors and the establishment of trade relations, (Middle 
East Monitor, 2011).  Egypt became the first Arab nation to recognize Israel, while Israel agreed 
to completely withdraw its troops from the Sinai Peninsula, which it had captured from Egypt 
during the Six-Day War of 1967, (Middle East Monitor, 2011).  Both nations also agreed to the 
cessation of a state of war that had existed since the 1948 Arab-Israel war.  Today, the bilateral 
relationship is often described as a “cold peace.”  However, Israel’s former Defense Minister, 
Binyamin Ben-Eliezer has said, “Egypt is not only our closest friend in the region, the 
cooperation between us goes beyond the strategic,” (Kershner, 2011).     
 
Due to those strategic interests, which the United States shares and supports, the Obama 
Administration has seemingly implicitly supported, despite some critical rhetoric, the military 
removal of a democratically elected president in Egypt by refusing to call the overthrow of 
President Mohamed Morsi a ‘coup’ in order to meet legal requirements for maintaining military 
aid to Egypt.  Even without explicit words of support, the fact that United States manufactured 
and financed military equipment was used for the military takeover of the country, and the 
ensuing suppression of dissent and massacre of civilians, is support enough for many including 
international human rights groups (A.I. 2013a).   
 
In fact, according to an October 2013 Amnesty International report, “the U.S. government still 
authorized arms exports to Egypt that bore a substantial risk of being used to commit or facilitate 
serious human rights violations.  These arms have included pump-action shotguns, military 
rifles, machine guns, ammunition, tear gas and other toxic agents.  They have also included spare 
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parts for AH-64 Apache attack helicopters used by Egyptian forces in surveillance of the Cairo 
protest camps, and armored Caterpillar D7R bulldozers to break up those camps,” (A.I., 2013a). 
Regardless of the public statements by both the White House and State Department, the Obama 
Administration can be none too pleased with the Egyptian military’s crackdown on dissent and 
use of U.S. made and funded weapons to massacre Egyptians in the streets.  These horrific 
events necessitate that the U.S. rethink its policy with Egypt and its continued funding of the 
Egyptian military.   
 
Events Preceding the Coup and the U.S Response: 
 
In January 2011 millions of Egyptians took to the streets to protest the 30 year authoritarian rule 
of President Hosni Mubarak.  The United States appeared to be caught flat footed during the 
early days of protests against the repressive rule of their long-time ally.  Moreover, they 
appeared initially to be on the wrong side of demands for a democratic transition by the Egyptian 
people.  In fact, after the anti-Mubarak protests began on January 25, 2011, in what has come to 
be known as the “Day of Rage,” then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated “the Egyptian 
government is stable” while angry protesters had taken to the streets throughout Egypt resulting 
in four dead and 500 people arrested, (Sharqieh, 2011, Brookings).   
 
Shortly after arriving in Egypt to join the revolution, prominent Egyptian dissident and former 
U.N. weapons inspector, Mohamed ElBaradei criticized Clinton for her comments.  "I was 
stunned to hear Secretary Clinton saying the Egyptian government is stable. And I ask myself: at 
what price is stability? Is it on the basis of 29 years of martial law? Is it on the basis of 30 years 
of [an] ossified regime? Is it on the basis of rigged elections? That's not stability, that's living on 
borrowed time," said ElBaradei (The Guardian, 2011).   
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At around the same time, vice president Joe Biden appeared on the PBS NewsHour with Jim 
Lehrer and seemed equally out of touch when he stated that Egypt’s President Mubarak “is not a 
dictator,” (PBS, 2011).  Criticism of the Obama administration was swift as the president himself 
miscalculated events on Egyptian streets when he initially called on President Mubarak to 
implement democratic reforms.  "To ask a dictator to implement democratic measures after 30 
years in power is an oxymoron.  It will not end until Mubarak leaves,” stated Mohamed 
ElBaradei (DeYoung, 2011).  The Obama administration’s initial reaction to the Egyptian 
people’s demands for basic democratic freedoms was in stark contrast to President Obama’s own 
message during a 2009 speech he gave in Cairo early in his presidency.  At that time, he 
acknowledged that all people share a desire for basic freedoms when he said, "I do have an 
unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things: the ability to speak your mind and have 
a say in how you are governed,” (Holzman, 2009). 
 
Regarding the U. S. reaction, Marwan Muasher, a vice president at the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, stated that the Obama administration "has been way behind the curve" 
(DeYoung, 2011).  "So far, they're just reacting. They're looking at it from two prisms - the need 
for stability . . . and the peace process in Israel.  I wish for once the United States would just 
leave Israel out of this and look at it for what it is. People are fed up with corruption, and they 
want a better government," (DeYoung, 2011).   
 
Perhaps recognizing that the reach of U.S. influence in Egypt and the region does not always 
extend to people on the street, an unnamed senior administration official said, "There's only so 
much we can do to affect the situation on the ground.  What I have found amusing is that civil 
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society contacts and friends have called me with outrage and complaints," to suggest that the 
Obama administration had not been responsive enough to the people’s demands.  This official 
suggested such complaints were issued from both sides in Egypt.  However, he was quick to 
remind that “we have big strategic interests there," (DeYoung, 2011).    
 
United States efforts to strike a balance between maintaining relations with a long-time ally who 
serves U.S. interests in the region while trying to convey support for the legitimate demands of 
the Egyptian people resulted in what many saw as an incoherent message.  Marina Ottaway 
summed up the views of many observers during a question and answer session of Middle East 
experts at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace during the early days of the 
revolution, “The United States is playing its hand badly right now — the Obama administration 
has managed to turn the crowds against the United States. The protests did not start this way, but 
there are more and more anti-American messages. Egyptians are increasingly critical of the 
position Washington is taking,” (CEFIP, 2011).  
 
During the same Q & A session, Michele Dunne, also with the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, got to the heart of the United States’ concerns about the effects 
democratization in Egypt would have on strategic interests, “The United States is in a difficult 
position. The Obama administration has been tepid in its support for democratization in Egypt 
and now has to play catch up.  The U.S. government is not eager to see Mubarak go, as there is 
great concern in Washington that any Egyptian leader coming after Mubarak will be inclined to 
cool relations with both the United States and Israel. This will further complicate many U.S. 
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efforts in the region that are already troubled, particularly Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking 
efforts,” (CEFIP, 2011). 
 
Perhaps recognizing the strong momentum of the revolution and that of the Arab Spring that had 
captured the attention of the world, President Obama quickly changed course and subsequently 
told Mubarak during an early February 2011 phone conversation that a transition to a more 
representative government “must begin now.”  Obama addressed the protesters directly by 
saying their "passion and dignity" was "an inspiration to people around the world, including here 
in the United States and to all those who believe in the inevitability of freedom.  I want to be 
clear, we hear your voices," he continued.  "Throughout this process, the United States will 
continue to extend the hand of partnership and friendship to Egypt," Obama said. "We stand 
ready to provide assistance that is necessary to help the Egyptian people as they manage the 
aftermath of these protests," (DeYoung, 2011). 
 
Days later on February 11, 2011, 18 days after protests began, Mubarak stepped down and ceded 
power to the Egyptian armed forces.  Despite the initial missteps, president Obama had seemed 
to find his footing supporting the revolution and the democratization of Egypt in time.  Upon 
learning of the announcement of Mubarak’s resignation, president Obama said, “I know that a 
democratic Egypt can advance its role of responsible leadership not only in the region, but 
around the world," (Whitlock, 2011).  
 
Leaders of Egypt’s armed forces told the Egyptian people in a statement, "there is no alternative 
to the legitimacy you demand."  They also guaranteed "free and honest" elections, without 
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specifying a road map or timeframe, but did indicate that they were “studying” the fluid situation 
(Whitlock, 2011).  Within two days of this statement, the military’s top commanders, known as 
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces or SCAF, had met two of the key demands of the 
revolutionaries by suspending the constitution and dissolving parliament (AP, 2013a).   
 
During the following month, a democratic road map was set forth by SCAF and put to a vote by 
Egyptians to establish a timeline for parliamentary elections, presidential elections, and the 
drafting of a new constitution (AP, 2013b).  The road map was met with heavy criticism from the 
start.  Many secular revolutionaries had argued that a constitution should be written first, fearing 
that early parliamentary elections would favor the better organized Islamists, namely the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), and the more conservative 
Nour Party.  The secularist’s fears were borne out when parliamentary elections took place from 
November 2011 to February 2012 with the Islamists, FJP and Nour Party, the most politically 
organized segment of the Egyptian populace, winning large majorities of approximately 75% in 
the legislative lower house of parliament, and a 90% majority in the significantly less powerful 
upper house of parliament, thus setting the stage for presidential elections (AP, 2013b).   
 
The first round of presidential elections was held on May 23 and May 24, 2012, (AP, 2013b). 
Egyptians had thirteen candidates to choose among.  However, due to their failure to unite 
behind one liberal candidate, many secular revolutionaries largely offset each other’s votes and 
allowed Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate, and Ahmed Shafiq, a former Air 
Force commander who served as prime minister under Mubarak, to emerge as the top two 
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finishers to face each other in a second stage run-off vote (AP, 2013b).   Morsi won the run-off 
narrowly with 51.7 percent of the vote on June 16 and 17, 2012, (AP, 2013b).   
 
The Carter Center was one of three foreign NGO’s allowed to monitor the elections, along with 
the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa and a network of Arab election 
monitors (Pfeiffer, 2012).  The Carter Center expressed concern about the process, stating that 
Egyptian election officials’ practices contributed to “undermining the overall transparency of the 
process,” (Carter Center, 2012).   The president of the Carter Center, former U.S. president 
Jimmy Carter, criticized the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces' undemocratic practices 
leading up to and during the election, stating the way they “carve out special privileges for the 
military and inject themselves into the constitution drafting process, violates their prior 
commitment to the Egyptian people to make a full transfer of power to an elected civilian 
government," (Abdellatif, 2012).   
 
Despite these criticisms it is important to note that Ahmed Shafiq, the candidate running against 
the eventual winner, Morsi, was a former Air Force commander and Mubarak holdover who was 
viewed as the potential beneficiary of any anti-democratic practices by the SCAF.  In the Carter 
Center’s final report on the elections, they also stated “Egypt's first presidential election in the 
post-Mubarak era also marked the first time in the country's history that the head of state was 
directly elected by the people in a competitive election,” (Carter Center, 2012).  Shortcomings of  
the presidential election process were observed by international elections monitors, but Morsi’s 
win was widely regarded as the first democratic presidential election in Egypt’s history and had 
set the nation on a path to democracy as Egypt’s revolutionaries had demanded.  
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President Obama called president elect Mohamed Morsi to congratulate him (Murphy, 2013).  
Obama reiterated U.S. support for Egypt’s transition to democracy and the fulfillment of the 
demands of the revolution while expressing the desire to advance the shared interests of the two 
nations (Murphy, 2013).  However, in a sign of the conflicts to come, secular revolutionaries 
who had earlier protested against military involvement in politics immediately began calling for 
the SCAF to “protect the secular nature of the state,” due to their fears of the “Islamization of the 
state” under a Muslim Brotherhood president, (Carr, Adam, 2012).   
 
Morsi’s One-Year Presidential Term: 
Morsi’s one year term as president did not come without controversy.  His presidency was 
marked by incompetence and a lack of inclusion of opposing views that recognize Egypt’s 
pluralistic and highly polarized society.  However, the response to his incompetence 
domestically was hardly proportional or democratic.  Furthermore, some of what was perceived 
as incompetence was, in fact, various factions of what came to be known as Egypt’s “deep state” 
conspiring to sabotage his presidency, as will be discussed in the next section.   
 
For his part, Morsi did make attempts at inclusion and at democratic rule.  In fact, just days after 
he took office he offered the job of vice-president to Hamdeen Sabahi, one of the leading faces 
of the 2011 revolution and one of Egypt’s most prominent liberal figures (Bayoumi, 2014).  
Sabahi, who had been Morsi’s rival and had finished third in the 2012 presidential elections, 
behind Morsi and Ahmed Shafiq, refused Morsi’s offer, (Bayoumi, 2014).  Additionally, Morsi 
offered the position of Prime Minister on several occasions to Ayman Nour, another leading 
revolutionary figure who headed the Ghad al-Thawra Party, but was refused, (Elmasry, 2013).  It 
14 
 
has also been reported that Ahmed Maher, one of the leaders of Egypt’s revolutionary youth 
movement that helped topple Mubarak, was offered the post of presidential adviser to Morsi and 
also declined, (Elmasry, 2013).   
 
Thus, while many leading liberal figures backed Morsi during presidential elections, they refused 
to work with him when offered positions in his administration, underscoring the deep 
polarization in the country and the largely unfounded fears of an attempted Islamization of 
Egypt.  According to a Wall Street Journal report, Morsi tried to recruit liberal minded ministers 
for his administration.  However, he ultimately failed because they “refused to serve under a 
Brotherhood presidency” and engage in the democratic process, (Bradley, 2013b).          
 
Morsi’s first half-year in office was dominated by the constitution drafting process, and the 
controversy surrounding it.  However, responsibility for the controversy can be distributed 
equally among Egypt’s Islamists, including Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood, secular liberals and 
the Coptic Christian Church faction.  A 100 member constitutional assembly had been convened 
in March 2012, but had been dissolved the following month due to a court ruling after it was 
criticized for being dominated by the Islamists who had swept the polls during parliamentary 
elections, (Elmasry, 2013).   
 
On June 7, 2012, 22 representative political parties agreed to the make-up of a new constitutional 
assembly which included a more equitable composition of secular politicians, members of the 
security forces, the judiciary, trade unions, and leaders from the Muslim and Christian 
communities (Elmasry, 2013).  However, “when the list of the names was approved by the 
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parliament on June 12, 57 MP’s” representing non-Islamist parties “walked out refusing to 
participate in the process,” (Ottaway, 2012).  The new assembly had been comprised of 32 
Muslim Brotherhood members, 18 members of the more conservative Islamist party Al-Nour, 32 
liberal/non-Islamist party members and 18 representatives of state institutions that essentially 
represented a 50-50 split between Islamists and non-Islamists, (Elmasry, 2013).   It is important 
to note that both the disbanded assembly and the one in its place were formed before Morsi took 
office on June 30, 2012.  Nonetheless, he received much of the criticism for their composition 
and the controversy surrounding them.   
 
The compromise on the part of the Islamists gave a more equitable representation to the non-
Islamist parties than they had earned at the polls (Elmasry, 2013).  The Muslim Brotherhood’s 
Freedom and Justice Party had won 47 percent of parliamentary seats in the first post-revolution 
elections, while an alliance of more conservative Islamists had won another 25 percent of the 
seats (Kirkpatrick, 2012).  The remaining seats, representing roughly 28 percent of parliament, 
were distributed among the more liberal parties, including one heavily supported by the 
country’s Coptic Christian minority, and another which represented the former governing party 
under Mubarak, (Kirkpatrick, 2012).       
 
The constitutional assembly had been tasked with drafting a new constitution for Egypt, 
reflecting the democratic principles of the revolution.  However, it was marked by conflict from 
the beginning amid a pattern of unsubstantiated complaints in the media and by the non-Islamist 
factions in the assembly that it was “dominated” by the Islamist FJP and Nour Parties (Elmasry).  
Moreover, it began to appear that the non-Islamist factions who had been defeated soundly at the 
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polls were doing their part to sabotage the process by refusing to work with the Islamists, 
particularly the Muslim Brotherhood’s FJP members (Elmasry, 2013). 
       
Secular liberals and Christians in the assembly criticized the process as heavy handed by 
suggesting that FJP members were forcing Islamist articles into the constitution that only suited 
their interests, (Elmasry, 2013).  They refused to participate and ultimately boycotted the 
assembly altogether, rather than engaging in the democratic process.  Subsequently, secularists 
and Christians began to frame their criticisms of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood with the  
accusation that they were attempting the “Brotherhoodization” of the Egyptian state, (Elmasry, 
2013).   
 
This Brotherhoodization refrain had become dominant in Egyptian political discourse due to its 
popularization through Egypt’s biased privately owned media outlets, as well as state owned 
media (Elmasry, 2013).  Through this type of discourse, Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
Freedom and Justice Party were commonly accused of being “un-Egyptian” and of trying to take 
over Egypt, (Tamimi, 2014).  Moreover, false and unsubstantiated accusations that Morsi was 
negotiating to sell off key Egyptian assets such as the Suez Canal and the Pyramids of Giza were 
widely reported as fact, (Tamimi, 2014).   
 
This vilification essentially helped to sabotage the constitutional drafting process.  For example, 
Article 4 was often cited as a clear example by non-Islamists of the constitution being too 
illiberal. The article, which gave Al Azhar, the Islamic religious institution, oversight on matters  
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pertaining to Islamic law, had received some of the heaviest criticism from the liberal members 
of the constitutional assembly.  Ironically, Article 4 was a suggestion made earlier by the same 
liberals who were criticizing it, (Elmasry, 2013).   
   
Liberals and non-Islamists also criticized an article pertaining to the right to religious freedoms.  
This article was submitted by the Coptic Church representatives in the assembly and was 
subsequently included verbatim.  However, the article was later inexplicably criticized by non-
Islamists, including the Coptic Church itself, as an Islamist entry that did not adequately afford 
religious freedoms to non-Muslims in Egypt (Elmasry, 2013).  As the controversy wore on, the 
SCAF threatened to take matters into its own hands by either drafting a new constitution itself or 
by reviving the 1971 constitution.  The 1971 constitution had afforded basic democratic 
freedoms.  However, those freedoms were never recognized under Mubarak due to the enactment 
of emergency law.   
 
Meanwhile, the U.S. maintained normalized relations and aid to Egypt, despite concerns about 
Morsi’s ties to Palestinian Hamas, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.  However, in the 
midst of the domestic conflict regarding the constitution, Morsi alleviated those U.S. concerns, 
shared by Israel, by emerging as the key broker in negotiating a cease fire between Israel and 
Hamas on November 21 after a week of fighting, (Birnbaum, 2012).  The Washington Post 
described Morsi’s role as marking a “powerful comeback by Egypt on the international stage,” 
(Birnbaum, 2012).  In announcing the cease fire, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, 
“Egypt’s new government is assuming the responsibility and leadership that has long made this 
country a cornerstone of regional stability and peace,” (Birnbaum, 2012).   
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Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed with Clinton’s assessment when he 
announced the truce, “I would like to express my appreciation for the efforts of Egypt to obtain a 
cease fire,” (Birnbaum, 2012).  Morsi earned praise at home and abroad by publicly condemning 
Israel’s assault on Egyptian television while engaging in talks with President Obama to convince 
him that he could broker a deal.  In the end, he proved a strong, reliable ally, though “less pliant” 
than his predecessor Mubarak, (Birnbaum, 2012).  
 
The praise did not last long as one day later, on November 22, 2012, amid repeated threats by the 
judiciary to disband the constitutional assembly once again, Morsi issued a presidential decree, 
granting himself the power to legislate without judicial oversight,  (PBS, 2013a).  Morsi 
explained that his decree was temporary and that it was to “protect the revolution” and to prevent 
the disbanding of the constitutional assembly so that it could complete the draft constitution, 
scheduled to be put to a referendum on December 15.  However, protests by Morsi opponents 
took place outside the presidential palace on December 5 and 6 in opposition to the constitution 
draft process and to Morsi’s decree, (HRW, 2012).  Muslim Brotherhood members clashed with 
members of the opposition as security forces stood by; and ten people, most of them members of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, were killed, along with 748 people injured, (HRW, 2012).   
 
Human Rights Watch condemned the lack of security and president Morsi’s December 6 speech, 
in which he referred to “confessions” by protesters who had been illegally detained and 
interrogated by Muslim Brotherhood members (HRW, 2012).  Joe Stork, of Human Rights 
Watch said, “President Morsi spoke out against the victims,” instead of speaking out against their 
illegal detention and abuse.  Furthermore, according to Human Rights Watch, Morsi also failed 
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to call for a full investigation and he “violated the rights of the detainees to a presumption of 
innocence because of his statements,” (HRW, 2012).        
      
President Obama expressed his “deep concern” about the violence in Egypt and called Morsi to 
encourage dialogue between opposing sides without “preconditions,” (Alberts, 2012).  However, 
while Morsi rescinded his initial decrees on December 8, critics argued he had already 
accomplished his goal, which was to push the draft constitution through the constitutional 
assembly that was now being boycotted by almost all non-Islamist members (AP, 2013).  The 
military, which had largely remained behind the scenes since Morsi took office, issued a 
statement in which it warned of “disastrous consequences” if the crisis was not resolved through 
“dialogue,’” (El Deeb, 2012).   
 
In response to the military’s warning, President Morsi called for dialogue on the same day the 
military issued its statement, (El Deeb, 2012).  However, main opposition leaders declined to 
attend and at least three people in attendance left shortly after the meeting started (El Deeb, 
2012).  Failing to come to an agreement, Morsi maintained the date of the constitutional 
referendum despite mass protests continuing in the streets (AP, 2013b).  
    
As scheduled, the constitutional referendum was put to a vote during two rounds on December 
15 and 22.  While the voting was marred by controversy and violence, which caused a low voter 
turn-out of only 32.9 percent, the referendum passed with 63.8 percent voting in its favor.  The 
State Department released a statement noting that “Many Egyptians have voiced deep concerns 
about the substance of the constitution and the constitutional process.  President Morsi, as the 
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democratic leader of Egypt, has a special responsibility to move forward in a way that recognizes 
the urgent need to bridge divisions, build trust, and broaden support for the political process,” 
(Ventrell, 2012).   
 
While Morsi certainly bears responsibility as Egypt’s president, the State Department statement 
failed to recognize the various elements that made his attempts at inclusion and democratic rule 
almost impossible.  Moreover, it ignores the troubling realities Morsi was facing in Egypt.  
Conspiracy theories designed to portray him and the Muslim Brotherhood as un-Egyptian, 
including unsubstantiated accusations about the “Brotherhoodization” of Egypt and negotiations 
to sell the Pyramids and the Suez Canal, were widely accepted as fact, (Elmasry, 2013).   
 
Nonetheless, Morsi’s critical mistake was his November presidential decree and his focus on 
pushing the constitutional referendum through too quickly rather than continuing to try to focus 
on building trust and greater consensus across a broad spectrum.  Moreover, Morsi failed to 
recognize that the resistance to him and the Muslim Brotherhood from the opposition went 
beyond politics.  It stemmed from what Egypt expert Shadi Hamid called “existential passions,” 
that were part of what he saw as an ideological struggle about Egypt’s identity.  Hamid asserts 
that, “so-called liberals …were afraid that if the Brotherhood stayed in power it would change 
the Egypt that they knew and loved and had grown accustomed to,” (Arab American Institute, 
2014).     
 
The “existential passions” Hamid refers to manifested themselves in continued conflicts with the 
opposition that dominated the second half of Morsi’s year in office.  There was his ongoing 
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battle with the judiciary, which he had accused of trying to stage a comeback of the Mubarak 
regime and of threatening to disassemble the constitutional assembly a second time (Bradley, 
2013b).  There were also the ongoing protests and clashes in the streets between pro-Morsi 
supporters and the opposition, who were demanding that he step down and call for early 
presidential elections after his November presidential decree (Bradley, 2013b).   
 
Morsi remained defiant in the face of the opposition on the one hand.  However, one of the 
leaders of the opposition, activist Shadi Al Ghazali Harb, acknowledged that, for their part, the 
opposition were equally difficult, “We managed to get the political atmosphere into a deadlock.  
The only conditions that the opposition put for dialogue were impossible conditions,” (Bradley, 
2013b).  Having failed to work constructively with the non-Islamists during his first months in 
office, the Morsi government showed favoritism toward Islamist groups and harassed or 
threatened the opposition, (Hamid & Wheeler 2014).   
 
However, as the Brookings Institution’s Shadi Hamid and Meredith Wheeler point out, Morsi did 
not systematically repress opponents (Hamid & Wheeler, 2014).  Hamid and Wheeler scored 
Morsi’s year in power according to the Polity IV Index, “one of the most widely used empirical 
measures of autocracy and democracy,” (Hamid & Wheeler, 2014, Polity IV, 2013).  Contrary to 
claims by the opposition, Hamid and Wheeler’s empirical analysis finds that “Egypt under Morsi 
was undergoing a remarkably ordinary transition…falling almost exactly at the mean value of 
political transitions globally,” (Hamid & Wheeler, 2014). 
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Nonetheless, the armed forces, which had largely remained on the sidelines during Morsi’s first 
five months in office, exploited the deep polarization in the country by claiming to support the 
strong opposition to Morsi, much as they did during the toppling of Mubarak.  In fact, an 
Associated Press report suggests that while the military appeared to publicly support Morsi 
during the early months of his presidency, they had actually planned “for months to take greater 
control of the political reigns in Egypt,” (AP, 2013a).  According to the AP report, Morsi-
appointed defense minister, Abdel Fatah el Sisi, had “profound policy differences” with Morsi, 
(AP, 2013a).  Furthermore, Sisi and the military scoffed at Morsi’s attempts to “flex his civilian 
authority” over Egypt’s armed forces, (AP, 2013a).  Ultimately, the military and other elements 
of what is known as the “deep state” worked to orchestrate Morsi’s removal from power.   
 
The ‘Deep State’ 
The term “Deep State” is largely a Turkish concept that, with respect to Egypt, refers to an 
assortment of long-standing bureaucratic, military, and security forces that wield tremendous 
influence within Egyptian institutions, and which many saw as undermining Morsi’s 
government, (Childress, 2013).  According to experts, these elements of the deep state, with deep 
remnants of the Mubarak regime still in place, were the real ones in power during Morsi’s 
presidency.  In a PBS Frontline report, Khaled Fahmy, a historian at the American University in 
Cairo, argued that Morsi’s and the Muslim Brotherhood’s electoral victories did not effectively 
change the balance of power in Egypt, (Childress, 2013).  Fahmy describes the institutions 
comprising the deep state in relation to the Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi by 
explaining that the Muslim Brotherhood was, “supposedly at the helm of the state, but in fact 
they are missing the very important backing of four important aspects of the political regime: the 
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police, the army, the judiciary and the press.  So they are in power, but they’re actually not in 
power,” (Childress, 2013).   
 
Despite Fahmy’s understanding of the Deep State’s power, he had initially supported the military 
coup and even went so far as to defend its “legitimacy,” based on his early view that the military 
had bowed to the “will of the people,” (Saad, 2013).  However, by September, 2013 Fahmy 
began to backtrack in his support of the coup by expressing concerns about the direction Sisi was 
taking the country.  Fahmy said then, “I think (in) Sisi we have something much more ominous, 
much more dangerous.  It seems that this is someone who has much more serious things in 
mind,” (PBS, 2013b).         
 
George Washington University political science professor and Egypt expert Nathan J. Brown 
explains the role of the deep state in Egypt, and the way he saw it working against the Morsi 
government.  He says, “There is no doubt that the judiciary as a whole came to regard Morsi as 
an enemy; that the military was a dominant (though hardly sole) actor in the downfall of Morsi; 
and that the security apparatus played a dirty game against him,” (Brown, 2013).  However, 
Brown argues that it “might be a bit shallower and is certainly much less coherent than many of 
those who use the term imply.  And while it is influential, there is much in the state that eludes 
its tight grip,” (Brown, 2013).   
 
According to numerous expert accounts on the topic, including that of the Brookings Institution’s 
Bessma Momani, despite friction that might exist among institutions within the deep state, they 
seemed to be able to unite around the common goal of undermining Morsi’s legitimacy, 
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(Momani, 2013).  Momani explains, “Bureaucrats allowed the interruption of electricity and fuel 
supplies to create artificial shortages and line queues throughout the country.  On rumors of 
energy shortages in liberal Egyptian media, fuel prices further skyrocketed causing panic buying 
and hoarding (Momani, 2013).  
 
“The Morsi government, as a precondition to an International Monetary Fund loan, had tried to 
implement a smart-card system to better target subsidized fuel for the country’s poor. Fearing the 
government could track fuel supplies, corrupt petroleum ministry officials with ties to Mubarak-
era cronies refused to implement it,” (Momani, 2013).  However, Egypt’s military backed 
interim government began gradually implementing Morsi’s smart card system in early 2014, 
(IRIN, 2014).  Furthermore, it has been widely reported that problems of fuel shortages, 
electricity blackouts, and police refusing to perform their jobs suddenly disappeared the day after 
Morsi was overthrown.  “The day after Mr. Morsi was removed from power, Egypt’s fuel 
shortages were no more, its electricity supply went uninterrupted and traffic police suddenly 
went back to work,” (Momani, 2013).   
 
June 30 to July 3 
On June 30, 2013 millions of Egyptians took to the streets again, this time calling for president 
Morsi to step down on the one year anniversary of his election to office.  Some 500 miles away 
in Tel Aviv, secretary of state John Kerry took questions about the volatile events in Egypt.  In 
response to one question, Kerry offered the following:  “I have talked to Mr. ElBaradei, I’ve 
talked to Amr Moussa, I have talked with leaders of Gulf countries particularly,” (Kerry, 2013).  
Kerry did not mention having spoken with any members of Morsi’s government, such as the 
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foreign minister or prime minister, but only with members of the opposition who were 
demanding that Morsi step down. 
 
The protests of June 30 had been weeks in the making.  A small, little known protest group 
founded in late April by five young activists called Tamarod, meaning rebel in Arabic, had 
started a movement to collect signatures demanding Morsi’s resignation.  They received the 
endorsement and backing of a number of liberal and revolutionary groups associated with the 
2011 revolution, as well as groups associated with remnants of the old Mubarak regime and, it 
would later be revealed, they had the support of the Egyptian security forces (Dreyfuss, 2013).   
Tamarod claimed to have gathered 22 million signatures during the two months before the June 
30 protests.  Tamarod also claimed, along with other revolutionary groups and state media, that 
30 million people protested on the streets of Egypt on June 30 for Morsi’s ouster, in what many 
termed a ‘continuation of the revolution’ of 2011, even attributing the number of protesters to 
Google Earth to lend credibility to the figure (Egypt Independent, 2013).   
 
However, the signatures Tamarod gathered have never been made public so their claims have not 
been verified.  As a frame of reference, the Muslim Brotherhood, which is widely recognized for 
its massive organizational infrastructure in Egypt that helped it dominate parliamentary elections, 
gathered fewer than one million anti-Mubarak signatures during a campaign in 2010 that lasted 
for a period of several months, raising questions about Tamarod’s claims, (Al-Amin, 2013).  As 
for the protest numbers, Google Earth released statements on more than one occasion asserting 
that any crowd size estimates attributed to Google Earth were false and that Google’s satellite 
imagery technology is not designed to estimate crowd sizes, (Egypt Independent, 2013).   
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There were widespread reports by Reuters, Le Monde, and The New York Times, among others, 
that while Tamarod may have started as a genuine grassroots movement, it only became well 
known through the backing of the military, at least one Egyptian billionaire, and others who 
stood to gain from Morsi’s removal.  In fact, one of Tamarod’s five founders said after the coup, 
“we were naïve,” in describing how a genuine grassroots movement was manipulated and 
ultimately taken over by leaders of Egypt’s security institutions and other factions of the deep 
state, (Frenkel & Atif, 2014).          
 
The next day, July 1, Defense Minister Sisi addressed Egyptians via state television and issued 
an ultimatum to Morsi:  “If you have not obeyed the people after 48 hours, it will be our … duty 
to put forward a road map for the future instead,” he said (PBS, 2013a).   Sisi had reportedly met 
with Morsi at least twice during the week before the June 30 protests began, (PBS, 2013a).  
During those meetings Sisi reportedly offered Morsi a deal, “including the appointment of a new 
prime minister and cabinet that would assume all legislative powers. The new leadership would 
also replace Morsi’s provincial governors, who were largely drawn from the Muslim 
Brotherhood,” (PBS, 2013a).  It was not clear who would make the new appointments, but 
indications are that it would be under Sisi’s leadership.   
 
According to a New York Times report, that same offer was made to Morsi during a phone call 
by an unidentified Arab foreign minister who said he was “acting as an emissary of 
Washington,” (Kirkpatrick & El Sheikh, 2013). Morsi stubbornly refused.  His foreign policy 
adviser, Essam el-Haddad, phoned both U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, Anne W. Patterson, and 
Susan E. Rice, the national security adviser, to inform them of Morsi’s refusal.  Upon completing 
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the phone calls, el-Haddad is reported to have said that the military takeover was about to begin, 
implying that Patterson and Rice were aware of the ultimatum issued to Morsi, (Kirkpatrick & El 
Sheikh, 2013).  According to the New York Times report, a Morsi aide texted an associate upon 
learning of the calls the following message:  “Mother just told us that we will stop playing in one 
hour,” using the commonly known sarcastic expression used among Egyptians to refer to their 
country’s Western patron, “Mother America,” (Kirkpatrick & El Sheikh, 2013).   
 
Based on published reports Secretary of State John Kerry was in contact with leaders of the 
opposition who wanted to overthrow Morsi.  At the same time, the people within the Obama 
administration who did make contact with members of the Morsi administration reportedly did 
so to try to convince him to step down after only one year in office.  While the United States 
cannot be blamed for Morsi’s overthrow, and there is no direct evidence that it was directly 
involved in the coup, the rhetoric of promoting and supporting democracy appeared to be in 
direct conflict with the actions of U.S. officials. 
 
On July 3, 2013 Egypt’s first and only democratically elected president in its history was 
removed from power.  The elite Republican Guard, responsible for his protection, “places Morsi 
under house arrest and prohibits him from communicating with anyone or from leaving his 
room,” (PBS, 2013a).  Within hours, Egypt’s military, led by Sisi, “suspends the constitution, 
shuts down three Islamist television stations and issues arrest warrants for 300 Muslim 
Brotherhood officials,” (PBS, 2013). The following day, Sisi appointed Supreme Court Chief 
Justice, Adly Mansour, as Egypt’s interim president, (PBS, 2013a). 
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In response to the events in Egypt, President Obama released a statement on July 3, the same day 
Morsi was removed from office.  In his statement, the president emphasized that “The United 
States does not support particular individuals or political parties,” (White House, 2013).  The 
statement ignored the reality that the Egyptian military, funded and trained by the United States, 
had involved itself in the political landscape in Egypt and had toppled a democratically elected 
president.  Obama did not use the word coup.  
   
Was it a Military Coup? 
Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington defines a coup d’état as “the effort by a political 
coalition illegally to replace the existing governmental leaders by violence or the threat of 
violence,” (Varol, 2013).  Similarly, in his Glossary of Political Economy terms, University of 
Auburn political scientist Paul Johnson defines a coup d’état as, “a quick and decisive extra-legal 
seizure of governmental power by a relatively small but highly organized group of political or 
military leaders, typically by means of the unexpected arrest or assassination of the incumbent 
chief executive and his principal supporters within the government.  Most frequently, coups are 
initiated and led by high-ranking military officers,” (Johnson, 2005).    
 
“Egypt Army Topples President, Announces Transition,” read the headline of a July 3, 2013 
Reuters article (Perry & Saleh, 2013).  Another part of the  July 3, 2013 statement by president 
Barack Obama in response to the events in Egypt read, “we are deeply concerned by the decision 
of the Egyptian Armed Forces to remove President Morsi and suspend the Egyptian 
constitution,” (White House, 2013).  President Obama and his administration seemed to go to 
great lengths to avoid labeling Morsi’s removal a coup.  In fact, they avoided making a 
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determination altogether.   It seems clear that the reason the Obama administration has refused to 
call the military removal of Mohamed Morsi a ‘coup’ is because doing so means that the United 
States would then be bound by U.S. law to suspend its military aid to Egypt.   
 
Approximately three weeks after the Egyptian military’s removal of Morsi, on July 26, 2013 
State Department Spokesperson, Jen Psaki explained the United States position thusly, “The 
legal decision that was made was that we have reviewed and we do not need to make a public 
determination on whether or not a coup happened or not,” (State Department, 2013a).  In other 
words, the Obama Administration, after consultation with its team of attorneys, had determined 
that it could simply avoid making a determination, at least a public one, about events in Egypt, 
and thereby skirt U.S. laws.  Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 states the 
following: “None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to this Act 
shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance to any country whose duly 
elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree: Provided, That assistance 
may be resumed to such country if the President determines and reports to the Committees on 
Appropriations that subsequent to the termination of assistance a democratically elected 
government has taken office,” ( Library of Congress, 1997-1998).   
 
Psaki further explained, “It is not in our national interests to make such a determination”......and 
that “there’s no question that there’s a larger issue of our strategic interests here and our interests 
as it relates to regional peace and security,” (State Department, 2013a).  To emphasize her point, 
Psaki added, “Our national security interests influence our policy as it relates to aid with Egypt,” 
defining Egypt as a “unique case,” (State Department, 2013a).  The U.S. decision to avoid 
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making a determination, coupled with Psaki’s repeated mention of U.S. strategic interests, makes 
it clear that the interests of Egypt and rhetoric about supporting democracy are secondary to 
those of the United States, even when the U.S. risks violating its own laws.  Such inarticulate 
dancing around questions and legal maneuvering that disregard U.S. laws and the interests of the 
Egyptian state and its people are highly problematic given the United States’ unique relationship 
with the Egyptian military.  Furthermore, it underscores the belief that the United States had 
made a short-sighted decision to deal dishonestly with its partner in the region in the pursuit of 
its own strategic interests.   
 
While it’s to be expected for the United States to pursue its own strategic interests, it cannot be 
ignored that an American trained and funded military had overthrown its democratically elected 
president and Commander in Chief.  Furthermore, the Obama Administration’s actions in 
response to the coup raise the question of whether the United States has become an enabler of the 
security apparatus in Egypt, with their unchecked powers, so long as the security forces help 
serve U.S. interests, even at the expense of basic human rights for the Egyptian people and in 
direct contradiction with American rhetoric about supporting democracy.     
 
On August 5, 2013 Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham traveled to Egypt to meet with 
Egypt’s interim leaders and with leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood to help start a national 
dialogue of reconciliation.  Unlike the Obama Administration, McCain and Graham both 
described events in Egypt as a coup, (Everett, 2013).  Challenged repeatedly by Egyptian 
reporters on their definition of a coup, McCain replied, “I’m not here to go through the 
dictionary.  If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it’s a duck, (Everett, 2013).   
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However, the senators stopped short of calling for a suspension of military aid to Egypt.  Both 
senators had voted against a bill that would have cut assistance to Egypt the week before their 
trip.  They joined a number of senators who argued that cutting assistance to Egypt, “would work 
against the interests of Israel,” (Everett, 2013).  Thus, while acknowledging a military coup took 
place, they placed the interests of Israel above supporting democracy in Egypt or U.S. law for 
that matter.    
 
With assurances from the U.S. that military aid would not be suspended, security forces began 
working to quash any dissent shortly after Morsi was removed from power.  In fact, the military 
appeared to be preparing and conditioning the Egyptian public for a campaign of annihilation of 
Islamist opposition that became increasingly more brazen and ruthless until it reached a level that 
had never before been seen in Egypt’s modern history.  Human Rights Watch lists 13 incidents 
since the revolution of January 2011 in which protesters have been killed by Egypt’s U.S. funded 
security forces, (HRW, 2013a).  However, a series of massacres in the days and weeks after the 
military coup appeared specifically designed to eliminate any further dissent.   
 
Psaki’s aforementioned press briefing comments explaining that the United States did not need 
to determine anything publicly about events in Egypt that could impact U.S. interests regarding 
military aid to Egypt had come 18 days after the first mass killing of Egyptian civilians had taken 
place.  It was Monday July 8, five days after Morsi was removed from power and placed under 
arrest at the Republican Guard club in Cairo.  Morsi supporters had camped outside the 
Republican Guard club, where Morsi was being detained, (Kingsley, 2013).        
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According to an investigative report by the British newspaper the Guardian, at 3:17 am the call 
to the dawn prayer was made and most of the 2,000 people camped at the sit-in, which included 
women and children, gathered to pray.  Because Muslims must face the holy site of Mecca 
during their prayers, people had knelt to pray with their backs to the barbed wire fences 
protecting the entrance to the club where security forces were stationed.   Within the hour 
security personnel opened fire, and according to the Guardian’s investigation, “at least 51 people 
were killed by Egyptian security forces and at least 435 injured,” (Kingsley, 2013).   
 
Also among the killed were two policemen and one army soldier, with 42 members of the 
security forces injured (Kingsley, 2013).  According to the Guardian, “the army said that the 
motorcyclists fired shots, that people attempted to break into the compound, and that the soldiers 
then had no choice but to defend their property, (Kingsley, 2013).  However, the Guardian’s 
week long investigation concluded that Egyptian “security forces launched a coordinated assault 
on a group of largely peaceful and unarmed civilians,” (Kingsley, 2013).    
              
To the United States’ credit, on July 24 it halted the delivery of four F-16 fighter jets to Egypt in 
response to the turmoil and massacre that had taken place.  However, the administration 
appeared to be taking careful measures to not alienate their Middle East ally.  According to a 
Washington Post report, an unidentified official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, 
explained, “This is not a way of punishing them. It gives us more time to consult with Congress, 
walk them through our strategy and explain our views to them,” (Londono, 2013).  Numerous 
reports indicate that strategy was to resume military aid to further U.S. strategic interests in the 
region.  Republican congressman Vern Buchanon applauded the decision by stating, “arming a 
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military that just this month massacred 50 of its own people would have been a grave mistake,” 
in an obvious reference to the massacre described above (Londono, 2013). 
 
On the same day delivery of the fighter jets was halted, Egypt’s defense minister Sisi appeared 
on state television in full military attire and dark sunglasses to ask Egyptians to take to the streets 
in demonstrations that Friday, after their Friday prayers, “to give me the mandate and order that I 
confront violence and potential terrorism,” (Fisher, 2013).  “I’m asking you to show the world.  
If violence is sought, or terrorism is sought, the military and the police are authorized to confront 
this,” (Fisher, 2013).  Sisi’s speech and request for a mandate is problematic for myriad reasons.   
 
Firstly, a nation’s security forces are not required to ask for permission or authorization from the 
masses to perform their duty of upholding the law.  If Egypt was under a threat of terrorism, it is 
unlikely that the head of the armed forces would first go on state television to ask the people’s 
permission to protect them.  Secondly, that Sisi chose to do so, raises the question about his 
motives and whether he was actually seeking public support for the repression of not only the 
Muslim Brotherhood, but of any dissenting voices against the state moving forward, as now 
appears to clearly be the case with the shuttering of critical television news stations and 
publications, mass arrests, and the passing of anti-protest laws, among other things.   
 
Finally, that the defense minister of Egypt, not the interim president or the prime minister, would 
be the one to request such a mandate from the Egyptian people raises the question of who was 
running the country.  In response to the request for a mandate, people turned out en masse.  For 
its part, Tamarod posted a message on its Facebook page asking Egyptians to “support the armed 
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forces in the coming war against terrorism and cleansing the land of Egypt,” (Abedine & 
Abdelaziz, 2013).   
 
In its daily press briefing, the State Department avoided expressing any concern about what 
Sisi’s mandate might mean for the chances of a democratic Egypt.  Spokesperson Jen Psaki 
labeled questions about whether Sisi was asking for a mandate, “a hypothetical that hasn’t 
happened,” (State Department, 2013b).  Instead, Psaki limited her response by stating, “In this 
specific case, we’re concerned about the possibility of this leading to more violence and that’s 
our concern.  And we saw his (Sisi’s) remarks, and that’s our concern about it,” (State 
Department, 2013b).   
 
Three days after Psaki’s comments, the second massacre in three weeks occurred after Sisi was 
given his “mandate” the day before when hundreds of thousands of Egyptians marched in 
support of the military, (Fahim & El Sheikh, 2013).  The violence came hours after Egypt’s 
interim president Adly Mansour announced, “the state has to impose order by all force and 
decisiveness,” in reference to general Sisi’s appearance on state television asking for Egyptians 
to give him a mandate to “fight terrorism,” (HRW, 2013b).  At least 74 pro-Morsi Egyptians 
were killed, on July 27, in clashes with Egypt’s security forces and plain clothed men standing 
alongside them.  According to a Human Rights Watch investigation, those killed were shot in the 
head, neck or chest over a period of several hours during clashes that took place on a road near a 
Muslim Brotherhood sit in at Raba’a al Adawiya Mosque in eastern Cairo (HRW, 2013b).   
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According to the Human Rights Watch investigation, which included review of video footage 
provided by witnesses and Egyptian security forces, as well as interviews with eye witnesses and 
doctors at the scene, security forces, flanked by plain clothed civilians, began by firing tear gas at 
protesters.  In response, protesters threw rocks and set cars on fire, (HRW, 2013b).  Security 
forces then followed the firing of tear gas with live fire in what, according to doctors, appeared 
to be intended to kill based on bullet wounds predominantly targeting the head, neck and chest, 
(HRW, 2013b).  Human Rights Watch deputy Middle East and North Africa Director Nadim 
Houry,  said, “The use of deadly fire on such a scale so soon after the interim president 
announced the need to impose order by force suggests a shocking willingness by the police and 
by certain politicians to ratchet up violence against pro-Morsy protesters.  It is almost impossible 
to imagine that so many killings would take place without an intention to kill, or at least a 
criminal disregard for people’s lives, (HRW, 2013b).” 
   
During a televised news conference a few hours after the clashes, Interior Minister Mohamed 
Ibrahim made no mention of the high death toll and denied any responsibility on the part of his 
security forces by stating they “have never and will never shoot a bullet on any Egyptian,” 
(Fahim & El Sheikh, 2013).  Egypt’s new leadership appeared to have been emboldened to be 
more ruthless in this massacre than the first one on July 8, given the so-called “mandate” and the 
rather indifferent U.S. response.  According to the New York Times report, Secretary of State 
John Kerry urged Egypt’s leaders “to help their country take a step back from the brink,” (Fahim 
& El Sheikh, 2013).   
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Kerry continued by asking Egypt’s leaders to “respect the right of peaceful assembly and 
freedom of expression,” (Fahim & El Sheikh, 2013).  However, only five days later Kerry 
changed his tone during an interview on Geo News TV in Pakistan when he said regarding 
Egypt’s military, “in effect they were restoring democracy,” (Bradley & Shaw, 2013).  Kerry’s 
statement not only ignored reality, his talking points were in direct contradiction to Hamid’s and 
Wheeler’s previously mentioned empirical analysis that found Morsi’s year in power to be 
“remarkably ordinary,”(Hamid and Wheeler, 2014).   
   
Kerry continued by suggesting, “The military did not take over, to the best of our judgment – so 
far, so far – to run the country.  There’s a civilian government,” (Bradley & Shaw, 2013).  While 
such dishonest comments ignore the fact that Sisi had appointed the interim president and 
appeared by all indications to be running the country after his removal of Morsi, they were 
consistent with earlier comments by Jen Psaki which implied that U.S. strategic interests 
outweighed support for democracy and human rights in Egypt, even in light of massacres using 
weapons, equipment and training provided by the United States.  Moreover, they make the U.S. 
appear increasingly complicit in events in Egypt.    
 
Mohamed Morsi’s detention and placement under house arrest had reached six weeks on the 
morning of Wednesday August 14, 2013.  Thousands of Morsi supporters remained camped out 
at sit-ins in Rab’a al-Adawiya square in front of the Rab’a al- Adawiya Mosque in Nasr City, 
(HRW, 2013c).  That same day, Egypt’s interim president, Adly Mansour, declared a nationwide 
curfew and state of emergency, (HRW, 2013c).  Security forces had warned for weeks that they 
would clear the sit-in because it had disrupted residents and businesses in the area.  However, 
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they had promised that the dispersal would be gradual and that protesters would be allowed safe 
exit, but had given no time frame of when it would take place, (HRW, 2013c). 
 
According to a year-long Human Rights Watch investigation, residents in the area heard 
warnings over loudspeakers at around 6:15 a.m. that morning to stay away from windows in their 
homes, (HRW, 2014a).  Fifteen minutes later, the assault started.  While witnesses and 
journalists confirmed that loudspeakers announced the locations of safe exits, Human Rights 
Watch also confirmed that snipers were stationed high atop those exits and shot anyone 
attempting to leave or enter for nearly 12 hours, (HRW, 2014a).  Snipers also shot anyone 
attempting to enter or exit Rab’a Hospital, including those already wounded, (HRW, 2014a).   
 
According to Human Rights Watch, the Egyptian military government had planned and 
anticipated the massacre at the highest levels, (HRW, 2014a).  Interior Minister Mohamed 
Ibrahim said one day after the massacre that “the dispersal plan succeeded 100 percent,” (HRW, 
2014a).  In September, 2013 Prime Minister Hazem al-Beblawy said of the casualties, “We 
expected much more,” contradicting government claims of planning a peaceful dispersal, (HRW, 
2014a).    Even Defense Minister Sisi acknowledged he spent “very many long days to discuss 
all the details” of the Rab’a dispersal, (Hearst, 2014a).    
 
A minimum of 817 people were killed that day, but more likely at least 1,000, including 8 
members of the security forces, (HRW, 2014a).   According to Egyptian government officials 15 
guns were ceased during the dispersal from the tens of thousands of protesters, contradicting 
government claims that protesters were heavily armed, (HRW, 2014a).  Perhaps the most 
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incriminating piece of evidence that the Egyptian military government had planned the massacre 
at the highest levels is that not a single police or army officer has been charged or held 
accountable for what Human Rights Watch Executive Director Kenneth Roth called, “one of the 
world’s largest killings of demonstrator in a single day in recent history,” (HRW, 2014a).  
Moreover, in what seems like an attempt by the government to whitewash the massacre are the 
confirmed reports of families being forced to sign death certificates that falsely indicate the cause 
of death as suicide or auto accident as a condition for being allowed to claim the bodies of their 
loved ones, ( Chick, 2013). 
 
President Obama interrupted his vacation in Massachusetts’s Martha’s Vineyard to condemn the 
attacks on civilians.  He announced the cancelation of the biannual joint military exercises 
known as Bright Star and indicated that his national security team would be reviewing the 
incident to see if further action was warranted.  Obama said, the United States “strongly 
condemns the steps that have been taken by Egypt’s interim government and security forces,” 
(Chick, 2013).  And while president Obama indicated that cooperation between the two nations 
could not continue “when civilians are being killed in the streets and rights are being rolled 
back,” he stopped short of announcing any suspension of the $1.5 billion in annual aid that Egypt 
receives.   
 
George Washington University International Affairs Professor Marc Lynch characterized 
President Obama’s failure to call for a suspension in aid in response to the massacre as 
“waffling” in an attempt to maintain U.S. influence, (Plumer, 2013).  “I’m not a big believer in 
the idea that we absolutely have to take clear stands all the time, but this is one of those times 
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when we have to.  The Egyptian military did what we explicitly told them not to do.  How can 
we still pretend that this aid is giving us influence?” said Lynch, (Plumer, 2013).  Furthermore, it 
seems reasonable to expect that the U.S. should have been aware of the pattern of increasing 
violence against civilians and that they should have had a contingency plan in place should 
something of this magnitude happen given the amount of military hardware they provide to 
Egypt and the troubling realities on the ground in Egypt. 
 
Within two months the United States did announce a partial cut in military aid that was in 
keeping with their inconsistent Egypt policy of the recent past.  In announcing the suspension of 
the delivery of F16 fighter jets, M1A1 tank kits, Harpoon missiles and Apache helicopters on 
October 9, 2013, “pending credible progress toward an inclusive, democratically elected civilian 
government through free and fair elections,” according to State Department spokesperson Jen 
Psaki, administration officials seemed to go out of their way to emphasize the need to continue 
their “strong relationship” with Egypt while emphasizing that the aid cut would have little 
impact, (Ackerman & Black, 2013).   Furthermore, while fielding questions from reporters about 
the announcement, administration officials continued to avoid labeling the events in Egypt a 
coup.  
 
On November 3, Secretary of State John Kerry flew to Cairo to meet with Egyptian officials to 
discuss the recently announced aid cut and the bilateral relationship between the two nations.  
Egypt expert Shadi Hamid wrote that “Kerry felt the need to heap an inordinate amount of praise 
on Egypt’s military rulers,” (Hamid, 2013).  Upon meeting with Egyptian officials Kerry said, 
“The roadmap is being carried out to the best of our perception…..the roadmap is moving in the 
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direction that everybody has been hoping for,” (Hamid, 2013).  According to Hamid, the 
Secretary of State also appeared to be trying to downplay the aid cuts with Egyptian officials 
when he said, “the aid issue is a very small issue,” (Hamid, 2013).  Hamid suggests that Kerry’s 
explanation of the aid issue to Egyptian officials “was something the U.S. had to do against its 
will, and that this slap on the wrist, like all the previous ones, too, would pass, (Hamid, 2013).   
 
Kerry’s statements referring to a democratic “roadmap,” ignored the fact that Egypt’s military 
had undemocratically eliminated, through massacring, arresting and eventually outlawing the 
Muslim Brotherhood, their main democratic competition at Egyptian polls.  Kerry’s statements 
also ignored the announcement less than two weeks before his Cairo visit of a new draft law to 
ban public meetings, processions and peaceful demonstrations in Egypt, (HRW, 2013d).  The 
bill, announced on October 21, “Would effectively mandate the police to ban all protests outright 
and to use force to disperse ongoing protests,” (HRW, 2013d).   Kerry’s comments reinforced the 
impression that because the United States was trying to have it both ways in Egypt, as Michele 
Dunne had noted, by championing democracy and human rights while maintaining strong ties to 
a repressive, authoritarian military, they were increasingly losing credibility internationally as 
supporters of democracy with their undemocratic policy toward Egypt that was marked by the 
Obama administration’s weak leadership manifested in an incoherent strategy, (CEFIP, 2011).    
               
Muslim Brotherhood Declared Terrorist Organization 
 
On Wednesday December 25, 2013 Egypt’s government declared the Muslim Brotherhood a 
terrorist organization.  Deputy Prime Minister Hossam Eissa alleged that the declaration was a 
response to a deadly bombing the day before in Egypt that killed 16 and wounded more than 100, 
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and for other terrorist acts including an assassination 60 years earlier, and the torture of 
opponents during the Raba’a Square demonstrations earlier in the year, (Michael & El Deeb, 
2013). However, the government offered no evidence to support its claims against the 
Brotherhood.  Meanwhile, an Al Qaeda inspired group, called Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, said it was 
behind the bombing, (Michael & El Deeb, 2013).  Human Rights Watch issued the following 
statement in response “The government’s decision on the Muslim Brotherhood follows over five 
months of government efforts to vilify the group.  By rushing to point the finger at the 
Brotherhood without investigations or evidence, the government seems motivated solely by its 
desire to crush a major opposition movement,” (HRW, 2013e). 
 
The Human Rights Watch statement reinforces what many experts see as increasingly clear 
during the past year’s events in Egypt.  Egyptian institutions associated with the deep state could 
not defeat the Muslim Brotherhood at the polls, neither in parliamentary elections nor in the 
presidential election in 2012.  As a result, they have resorted to a campaign that has not only 
vilified the group, but has forced it back underground through mass arrests of its leaders and 
massacres of its supporters in the streets.   
 
While declaring the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization will be viewed as putting the 
nail in their coffin by some observers, they have largely been an underground organization for 
most of their existence so it is likely that they will regroup and adjust to the new repressive 
environment in Egypt in order to survive, (Hamid, 2014a).  What should be of greater concern to 
the United States, and Israel, is the potential radicalization of some members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, or other Islamist sympathizers, and the potential for destabilizing terrorist acts that 
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are in conflict with U.S. strategic interests in the region.  For its part, the United States did not 
follow suit and has not declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization.   
 
Constitutional Referendum 
 
The headlines on January 18, 2014 seemed to mark a step backward for Egyptian democracy.  
“Egypt’s New Constitution gets 98% ‘Yes’ Vote,” read the headline in The Guardian, (Kingsley, 
2014a).  The hope that the 2011 revolution would do away with votes with dubious results and 
usher in a new era of democracy for Egypt seemed to end.  Even Mubarak’s final victory in 
which he garnered 88.6 % of the vote in the 2005 presidential election wasn’t as one sided, 
(Whitaker, 2005).  
 
The constitutional referendum was met with heavy criticism for the repression associated with it.  
Moreover, for all of the criticism levied against Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood for the 
constitution drafting process during Morsi’s term, the process under the military regime was 
much less democratic.  For example, there was no consensus on the constitutional assembly 
make-up as there had been under Morsi, despite claims to the contrary, (Cunningham, 2014).  In 
fact, the new regime appointed all 50 members of the new constitutional assembly on its own, 
and excluded the Muslim Brotherhood from participating, (Cunningham, 2014).  Plus, the 
repressive environment during the vote for the more recent referendum was also vastly less 
democratic than under Morsi.   
 
In fact, there were widespread reports of arrests of people for putting up ‘vote no’ posters, 
(HRW, 2014b).  According to the Washington Post, election monitors reported serious violations 
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and irregularities, including intimidation of the constitution’s opponents, (Cunningham, 2014).  
A statement by Transparency International said, “Politically motivated violence, intimidation and 
repression from state and non-state actors limited and conditioned citizens’ political and electoral 
participation,” (Cunningham, 2014).  
 
For all of the controversy, however, experts consider the content of the 2012 and 2014 
constitutions to be similar to each other and to the 1971 Egyptian constitution on which they 
were both largely based.  The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace compared the two 
constitutions and said of the 2014 version, “the draft is still very similar to the 2012 constitution, 
which was itself based on the previous constitution adopted in 1971,” (Carnegie Endowment, 
2013).  Mubarak ruled under the constitution of 1971, which guaranteed basic freedoms.  
However, because Mubarak declared a state of emergency for the majority of his 30 year rule, 
the articles in the 1971 constitution went largely unrecognized.  Likewise, the new regime has 
declared a state of emergency that has abolished any press freedoms, freedom of assembly, and 
many basic freedoms for citizens, including how they can vote on the constitutional referendum.   
 
Moreover, a key criticism of the new constitution is that it expanded the powers of the 
institutions that supported the forced removal of Morsi, including the judiciary, the military and 
the police (Carnegie Endowment, 2013).  According to Transparency International, “the political 
context in the run-up to the referendum impaired conditions to hold a fair and free referendum 
when compared with international standards,” (Transparency International, 2014).  Thus, the 
challenge for Egypt has not been the content of any of the constitutions in force during the last 
three regimes, rather it has been the willingness of the regimes to abide by the articles.  For 
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example, Article 65 of the new constitution states   “[a]ll individuals have the right to express 
their opinion through speech, writing, imagery, or any other means of expression and 
publication,” (Carnegie Endowment, 2013).  However, as previously mentioned Human Rights 
Watch has documented numerous arrests of Egyptians for putting up or possessing posters that 
encouraged a “No” vote on the most recent constitutional referendum, (HRW, 2014b).   
 
President Obama did not release any statements in the days following the constitutional 
referendum.  The State Department’s Jen Psaki said, “We remain deeply concerned by reports of 
politically-motivated arrests and detentions of political activists, peaceful demonstrators, and 
journalists in Egypt,” (State Department, 2014).  Beyond the expression of concern, there 
seemed to be no concrete plan in response to the repression associated with the constitutional 
referendum.    
 
During this period, the United States congress was preparing new legislation to allow the 
resumption of aid to Egypt.  Congress eventually passed a spending bill in January 2013 that 
essentially allows the Obama administration to “circumvent the Foreign Assistance Act” and 
resume aid to Egypt (Kimball, 2014).  As mentioned earlier, in announcing the suspension of aid 
in October 2012, State Department Spokesperson Jen Psaki had indicated that aid could resume, 
“pending credible progress toward an inclusive, democratically elected civilian government 
through free and fair elections,” (Ackerman & Black, 2013).  Again, the Obama administration’s 
rhetoric was in direct conflict with its actions.  
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What was becoming clear about United States policy in Egypt is that it was willing to support 
democracy, but not if it meant sacrificing potential influence with Egypt in the pursuit of U.S. 
strategic interests, which are bought with the military aid.  When asked in 2008 if military aid to 
Egypt should come with conditions, former U.S. ambassador to Egypt, Francis J. Ricciardone Jr., 
said the idea was “admirable but not realistic,” (Meyer, 2013).  And in 2009, then Defense 
Secretary Robert Gates said that military aid “should be without conditions,” (Meyer, 2013).  
 
The Obama administration actions subscribed to that philosophy.  According to experts, Egypt 
was not making the progress the resumption of U.S. aid required.  As Shadi Hamid wrote in 
November 2013, “Egypt, on almost any conceivable political indicator, is more repressive today 
than it was under the Mubarak regime. The sheer ferocity of the post-coup crackdown continues, 
with a slate of repressive laws recently announced in the guise of Egypt's "war on terrorism," 
(Hamid, 2013).  Thus, by any measure Egypt was not making the credible progress Psaki and the 
administration were referring to as the barometer for the resumption of aid.  Nor was Egypt on 
the “roadmap” to democracy as Kerry asserted during his November visit. 
 
Sisi Wins Mubarak Era Style Election 
 
Practically speaking, General Sisi had been the acting president of Egypt since the July 3, 2013 
coup.  In a January 2014 analysis, Shadi Hamid of the Brookings Institution pointed out that in 
the six months after the July 3 coup U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel spoke to Sisi “more 
than 25 times,” with seemingly little to no effect convincing Egypt’s defense minister, and acting 
head of state, to be more inclusive and democratic, (Hamid, 2014b).  Hamid argued that “it is 
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difficult to think of another case where U.S. policy is so completely divorced from realities on 
the ground,” (Hamid, 2014b).   
 
While much of the U.S. rhetoric after the coup has revolved around encouraging Egypt’s new 
regime to be more inclusive and democratic, there has also been a clear message that there will 
be no serious consequences for ignoring America’s advice.  As detailed earlier, even when there 
were consequences in the form of temporary aid suspensions, administration officials made a 
point of emphasizing that there was a desire to return to business as usual.  In fact, Secretary of 
State John Kerry went so far as to say, “the aid issue is a very small issue,” (State Dept. 2013).  
 
With the knowledge and implicit assurance that there would be support from the United States, 
as long as U.S. strategic interests in the region were maintained, Sisi was able to resign as 
defense minister and declare his candidacy for president on March 26, 2014.  He did so, after 
repeatedly claiming he had no aspirations for higher office and only after a claimed “mandate” 
from the people.  During the televised announcement declaring his candidacy Sisi stated he was 
“answering the demand of a wide range of Egyptians who have called on me to run for this 
honorable office,” (BBC, 2014).  
 
Only one other candidate announced that he would oppose Sisi’s bid: Hamdeen Sabahi, who had 
come in third to Morsi and Shafiq in 2012.  However, it was a foregone conclusion that Sisi 
would emerge as Egypt’s official new president, after effectively acting as Egypt’s head of state 
since the coup, (Abdel Samei, 2014). There were no presidential debates, no presidential 
campaign to speak of, except for carefully orchestrated talks by Sisi with hand selected 
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audiences and interviewers.  When in one television interview, Sisi was told that the people of 
Egypt were waiting to hear him share his program or platform for office, Sisi curtly replied, “If 
they wanted to know my program they should have told me this before I resigned as defense 
minister,” (Abdel Samei, 2014). 
 
Elections were scheduled for two days - May 26 and May 27.  However, because of low voter 
turnout, the election commission abruptly announced on the evening of the second day of voting 
that voting had been extended to a third day, May 28.   U.S. based Democracy International was 
allowed to observe the presidential elections.  Its president, Eric Bjornlund, issued the following 
statement: “Egypt’s repressive political environment made a genuinely democratic presidential 
election impossible,” (Democracy International, 2014).  Democracy International’s scathing 
report also criticized the extension of the elections into a third day by stating that there were no 
impediments to voting during the original first two days that would justify an extension, and that 
an extension should only be granted in “extraordinary circumstances,” (Democracy International, 
2014).  Nonetheless, on Tuesday June 3, 2014 it was announced that Sisi had won in a landslide 
by garnering 96.9% of the vote (LA Times, 2014).  Furthermore, while the official turnout was 
reported as 47.4 % of eligible voters, many experts dispute the validity of that figure, (Kingsley, 
2014b).    
 
The day after the election results were announced, the White House said that while it was 
pleased that international observers were allowed to participate in the election, "we also share 
concerns raised by observation groups about the restrictive political environment in which this 
election took place," (CNN, 2014).  The statement also indicated that President Obama planned 
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to talk with Sisi in the coming days to "to advance our strategic partnership and the many 
interests shared by the United States and Egypt," (CNN, 2014).   
 
All indications were that, despite the repressive environment and undemocratic elections that 
marked a step backward from Mubarak’s rule, the United States was returning to business as 
usual with Egypt.  The temporary suspensions of aid and delivery of military equipment have 
been lifted and aid is set to resume, with no penalties to speak of for Egypt.  So, while the 
Obama administration will likely continue with its rhetoric of supporting freedom and 
democracy for the Egyptian people, the message through their contradictory actions is that U.S. 
strategic interests outweigh support for democracy and human rights in Egypt.   
 
The Irony of Morsi Supporting U.S. Strategic Interests 
Mohamed Morsi’s shining moment on the international stage as president proved to be a 
reassuring moment for United States strategic interests in the region when he deftly brokered a 
cease fire between Israel and Hamas after ten days of fighting in November 2012, (Birnbaum, 
2012).  By contrast, Sisi’s opposition to Hamas has led to a loss of Egyptian influence in Gaza.  
One month into Sisi’s presidency, on July 8, 2014, Israel and Hamas began a conflict that has 
continued into its fifth week.  Hamas rejected an initial cease fire agreement proposed by Egypt, 
which it viewed as favoring Israel, (Levs, Mullen & Penhaul, 2014).  The disagreement revealed 
a deeper rift in the Arab world, with Sisi being accused by Hamas of favoring Israel because of 
Hamas ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, (Levs, Mullen & Penhaul, 2014).      
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Meanwhile, Israel rejected a cease-fire proposal by the United States that may have revealed 
another rift, this one between Israel and the United States.  Israeli media characterized the 
proposal as “being dismissive of Israeli concerns,” (Lee, Pace, 2014).   The criticism caused a 
strong push back from the Obama administration which criticized some in Israel of a 
“misinformation campaign,” (Lee, Pace, 2014).   The strong words out of Washington revealed a 
growing frustration with Israel within the Obama administration, marking a stark contrast 
between the present conflict and the 2012 Israel-Hamas conflict, which was resolved more 
expeditiously in keeping with U.S. strategic interests.  Furthermore, it underscores the view by 
experts that present U.S. policy toward Egypt has accomplished the opposite of the intended goal 
of stability in the region by supporting a military coup and its subsequent repression, both of 
which have caused instability and are in direct conflict with U.S. rhetoric about valuing human 
rights and promoting democracy in the Middle East. 
 
Moving forward, the U.S. should recalibrate its Egypt policy and send a strong message that 
repression cannot continue with U.S. support.  The Egyptian military’s interference in politics, 
with the continued political and financial support of the U.S., has not only destabilized Egypt, it 
can be argued that it has caused wider instability in the region.  There is the protracted conflict 
between Israel and Hamas, and there have been rifts among gulf nations. Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates and Kuwait have endorsed Sisi’s hardline stance with billions of dollars in 
support due to their own reservations about democracy and the Arab spring threatening their 
monarchies.  Meanwhile, Qatar and Turkey have sided with Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and 
Palestinian Hamas amid criticism from Egypt and their gulf allies of supporting ‘terrorism.’   
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Shortly after Mohamed Morsi was overthrown, Egypt expert Jason Brownlee, of the University 
of Texas, stated that “unlike the American public, the Egyptian military knows that the U.S. gets 
far more out of the relationship than it puts in: over-flight rights, prepositioning at Cairo West 
Air Base, intelligence on al Qaida,”(Curry, 2013).  Essentially the Egyptian military knows that 
because the U.S. views military aid to Egypt as helping to serve U.S. strategic interests, the 
United States is willing to continue placing those interests above the long-term interests of 
promoting democracy in the region.  However, in light of the instability inside Egypt during the 
past year that has now had a domino effect by hindering the ability of the U.S. to negotiate a 
cease fire between the Israelis and Hamas, the U.S. calculus no longer applies and needs a 
recalibration.  Egypt will not take seriously American rhetoric that condemns repression and 
state sanctioned violence against the opposition unless it is backed up with serious action.   
 
Policy Recommendations: 
1). The United States would be better served in the short term if it reconsidered suspension of 
some military aid, while eventually reducing military aid to what is required for “maintaining 
only the essential security and counterterrorism cooperation,” with Egypt, (Dunne, 2014).  An 
actual suspension of aid would help put the Egyptian military and Sisi on notice that they cannot 
continue with present policy and expect continued support from the United States.  Concerns 
about Egypt turning toward Russia in response to a tougher policy by the U.S. are mitigated by 
the fact that Egypt lacks the money to buy Russian equipment.  Saudi Arabia has provided 
billions to Egypt since the coup.  However, despite attempts by the Saudi government to refute 
the report, Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal is reported to have said, “We cannot 
support Egypt forever,” (MEM, 2013).  
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Furthermore, Egyptian military equipment is largely American made, meaning Egypt continues 
to have a need to rely on the U.S. and, therefore, has an interest in cooperating with U.S. 
demands to scale back repressive policies.  While the U.S. desire to main influence in Egypt 
through the continuation of aid is understandable, especially in light of concerns about renewed 
Egypt – Russia relations, it can be argued that the Obama Administration has tried that approach 
and failed thus far.           
 
2). The United States should begin a gradual redistribution of aid to Egypt that shifts the bulk of 
its $1.5 billion in annual aid from military assistance to economic aid programs.  Over a period 
of five years, military aid should be reduced by $200 million per year while economic aid is 
increased by the same amount until a minimum of $1 billion is devoted to economic aid 
programs per year to help support education and civil society organizations in Egypt.  
 
While it has been argued that economic aid has already been tried and failed in Egypt, some 
experts disagree.   New York University economist William Easterly says, “The tragedy of 
foreign aid is not that it doesn’t work, but that it has never really been tried, (p.170, Easterly, 
2005).  Easterly argues that the bureaucracy of the global aid community “suppresses critical 
feedback” that hinders its own ability to deliver results, (p.188, Easterly, 2005).  Easterly 
suggests reforms that focus more on the recipient country’s needs while teaching them self-
reliance, (Easterly, 2005).   
 
With that in mind, one of the most critical areas of need for Egypt is in education.  The Global 
Competitiveness Report for 2013-2014 places Egypt last in the world for its quality of primary 
52 
 
education, (Keddie, 2013).  A 2013 study also revealed that Egypt has the worst women’s rights 
record among the Arab world’s 22 countries, (Yashar, 2013).  Programs that devote increasing 
amounts to education and to civil society organizations that promote equality and equal rights 
can gradually help combat the currently repressive environment.  Such targeted programs can go 
a long way toward helping Egyptian society become self-reliant and more democratic in the long 
term.  A more democratic Egypt can be a better partner to Israel and the United States.      
 
3). In conjunction with a redistribution of aid, the United States, through USAID, should 
undertake a more comprehensive study in Egypt to determine institutional, economic and 
societal needs to help ensure that future aid programs can make the most impact by targeting 
areas of greatest need.  This should be done in conjunction with The Carnegie Endowment’s 
Michele Dunne’s suggestion for the U.S. to “Express support for the Egyptian people’s 
aspirations for prosperity, freedom, and justice, and assess progress based on whether citizens 
enjoy such benefits rather than on whether the current political road map is carried out,” (Dunne, 
2014).  Sending a message of support for the Egyptian people’s aspirations, combined with 
targeted aid will help promote good will in Egypt and the region that, again, will help make 
Egypt a better partner with the U.S. in the region.        
  
4). The United States should work to convince Israel that mature democracies historically do not 
go to war with each other (p. 154, Frieden, Lake & Schultz, 2013).  The security situation has 
deteriorated along the Egyptian-Israeli Sinai border since the military coup that overthrew 
Mohamed Morsi, (Siboni & Ben-Barak, 2014).  Furthermore, Israel is currently engaged in a 
protracted conflict with Hamas after more than one failed attempt at a cease fire. It is in Israel’s 
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long term interests and desire for stability to support human and economic development in 
Egypt, as well as in the region, rather than focus on short term stability objectives that create the 
potential for long term instability for Israel and its neighbors.  At the very least, Israel should not 
undermine efforts by the United States to support Egyptian society as it works toward the 
democratic future that the 2011 revolution demanded.   
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